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Résumé : Nous analysons la réponse qu’a donnée Otto Hölder à la célèbre
critique de la preuve archimédienne de la loi du levier par Ernst Mach et
nous la situons dans sa pensée epistémologique. Pour Hölder, la preuve de
la loi du levier fournit une étude de cas sur la déduction en mécanique.
Considérant la preuve comme un processus constructif et synthétique mon-
tant d’un niveau conceptuel à un niveau supérieur, Hölder parvient à défendre
la preuve d’Archimède contre la critique de Mach, pour qui au contraire une
preuve n’amène qu’à une vérité analytique.
Abstract: Otto Hölder’s reply to Mach’s renowned critique of the Archime-
dean proof of the Law of the Lever is analyzed and contextutalized as part of
Hölder’s epistemological theory. The proof of the Law of the Lever provided
for Hölder a case study on deduction in mechanics. He developed in it an
original understanding of proof as a constructive, synthetical process leading
to higher order concepts. This enabled him to avoid the view held by Mach
that proof can only lead to analytic truths, and to defend Archimedes against
Mach’s critique.
1 Introduction
The Law of the Lever was among the first laws of nature to be formulated in
quantitative terms. It dates back at least to Archimedes’ On the Equilibrium
of Planes and possibly even to Aristotle’s Mechanics. Shortly after its first
formulation, scholars like Archimedes and Euclid were already seeking to prove
it by means of deduction from general axioms and postulates. The Law of
the Lever thus composes the very core of rational mechanics. However, in
1883 Ernst Mach accused Archimedes’ proof of circularity, thereby provoking a
discussion about the role of proof in mechanics, and indeed about the nature of
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the foundations of mechanics as a whole. This discussion is associated first and
foremost with the name of Giovanni Vailati, though Otto Hölder was, in fact,
the first to reply to Mach’s criticism. 1 Hölder was interested in the proof of
the Law of the Lever as a case study on deduction in mathematical physics. He
agreed with Mach on experience being the only source of knowledge. But unlike
Mach, Hölder did not view deduction as a mere test of agreement between the
premises and the conclusion: For Hölder, deduction constructively bridges a
qualitative difference between the premises and the conclusion. He attempted
to explicate this concept of deduction in terms of “synthesis”.
In this paper, an outline of the discussion between Mach and Hölder will be
given, with particular stress on Hölder’s contributions and his epistemological
thought. The paper consists of two parts: In the first part (Section 2), I
shall present a rigorous analysis of Mach and Hölder’s assumptions, aims, and
strategies, given that they were at cross-purposes in this discussion, and they
themselves never clearly elaborated on their conflict of opinion. It will be
shown that Hölder tried to refocus the discussion on the role of proof in the
mathematical sciences. In the second part (Section 3), some key aspects of
Hölder’s account of deduction in the mathematical sciences will be discussed.
I will argue that Hölder provides a pertinent defence of Archimedes’ proof
against Mach’s critique.
2 The Hölder-Mach-controversy
2.1 The Law of the Lever
In modern terms, the Law of the Lever is a special case of conservation of
angular momentum: “If the total external torque is zero, then the total vector
angular momentum of the system is a constant” [Feynman, Leighton & Sands
1963, 20–25]. When applied to the “lever”, that is, to a rigid rod pivoted on
a fulcrum, this is to state that the lever is in equilibrium if the weights put
on it are reciprocally proportional to their distances to the fulcrum. This is
a descriptive law which can, however, be translated into a normative rule by
saying that reciprocal displacements of weights on both sides of the fulcrum do
not disturb equilibria. In this paper, the normative version will often be more
appropriate, since equilibrium-conserving manipulations of configurations of
masses will be in the main focus.
The Law of the Lever can be sited for the first time in Aristotle’sMechanics,
be it as an original element of the text or as a later addition. This text illus-
trates, as Beisenherz and Renn et al. pointed out, the recent appearance of
the lever with unequal arms in everyday life in ancient Greece. This instru-
ment allowed for determining weight by displacing a given counterweight on
1. Vailati already in 1897 published two papers on the proof of the Law of the
Lever and its critics [Vailati 1897a], [Vailati 1897b]. These texts however do not
contain any reference to Mach.
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the opposite arm of the lever ([Beisenherz 1980, 455–456]; [Renn, Damerow
& McLaughlin 2003, 47]). According to Renn et al., the lever with unequal
arms led to the generalization of the concept of equilibrium. This general-
ized idea accounted for the fact that weights evidently can be compensated
not only by weights, but also by distances. Concept formations like “force
of the weight” (Euclid) or “momentum ponderis” (Virtruvius) reflected this
idea [Renn, Damerow & McLaughlin 2003, 55]. I would like to add Stevin’s
concept of “evenstaltwichtigheid” as opposed to “evenwichtigheid” (that is, in
accordance with Dijksterhuis’s translation, “being of apparent equal weight”
and “being of equal weight” respectively), introduced in his De beghinselen der
weeghconst from 1586 [Stevin 1955, 38, 105]. Masses which compose a system
in equilibrium are of equal apparent weight; equality of weight can be assigned
to them only in the case that the system is a symmetric one. We can put
this in modern terms by saying that the force F of a body is a function of the
weight m and its position relative to the fulcrum d, F = F (m, d). It is clear
that F is a linear function of the weight m, since a (homogeneous) body m can
be conceived as consisting of parts mi whose forces together add to the total
force F (m) =
∑
i F (mi). The way F depends on d is the critical question,
because no similar reasoning holds for d: A mass m at distance d cannot be
conceived as compounded of n parts of mass m at the distance 1/n · d. The
Law of the Lever states that F is a linear function of d as well. However, it
should be noted that all kinds of functions, such as a power law of the form
F = m · dn, are compatible with the special case of the symmetric lever, i. e.,
the fact that equal weights can be displaced symmetrically without disturbing
the equilibrium.
2.2 Archimedes’ proof of the Law of the Lever
Archimedes presented an early proof of the Law of the Lever, that is, situated
it within a theory of deductive style. As Vailati [Vailati 1904], Dijksterhuis
(1938, quotations from the second English edition [Dijksterhuis 1987]), and
[Renn, Damerow & McLaughlin 2003] concordantly argue, the Archimedean
proof was essentially based on the notion of the center of gravity, that is,
according to Dijksterhuis, on the premise
that the influence exerted on the equilibrium by a body suspended
on a lever is judged exclusively by the gravity of the body and the
place of its center of gravity, and that the shape is immaterial
[Dijksterhuis 1987, 291]
and consequently
that a lever equilibrium is not disturbed, if one of the suspended
magnitudes is made to change its shape while preserving its weight
and center of gravity. [Dijksterhuis 1987, 292]
As Dijksterhuis made clear, the above was intended to be a reconstruction
of the actual cognitive content of the Archimedean theory [Dijksterhuis 1987,
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295]. Hölder and Mach, however, were not interested in a historical reconstruc-
tion of Archimedean physics; they were attacking a systematic problem of ra-
tional mechanics. In direct terms, their question was whether the Archimedean
proof was valid or not. 2 Accordingly, in the following I will disregard the ques-
tion of in how far Hölder and Mach did justice to Archimedes. Rather I shall
demonstrate the problem both attacked. In order to do so, I will first present
Hölder’s reconstruction of Archimedes’ proof.
Consider a body of weight 10 fixed at position 0 (fig. 1-32). This body is
successively cut into pieces of weight 1 which are symmetrically distributed
Figure 1: Hölder’s reconstruction of the Archimedean proof. Figures
32-36 from [Hölder 1924, 40]
pairwise around position 0 in linearly increasing distances till a uniform distri-
bution of ten unit weights is reached (fig. 1-34). In a next step, the four outer
weights on the left hand and the remaining six weights on the right hand
are symmetrically recombined at their respective geometric centers (fig. 1-35,
36). This finally produces two bodies of weights 4 and 6 at positions 3 and
2 respectively (fig. 1-36). The idea of the proof is as follows: Since the initial
distribution (fig. 1-32) was in equilibrium, and since only symmetrical, i. e.,
equilibrium conserving manipulations, have been carried out, the final distri-
bution (fig. 1-36) must still be in equilibrium. The final distribution however is
no longer symmetrical: The distances are inversely proportional to the weights,
a result which can easily be generalized for any pair of commensurable weights.
It should be emphasized that the Archimedean proof does not deal with ac-
tual manipulations, but rather intends to rationalize the Law of the Lever in
2. As regards this question, it was disputed by [Beisenherz 1980] whether
Dijksterhuis’ reconstruction is a plausible candidate for a systematic defense of
Archimedes. Beisenherz’ main point is that Archimedean statics should be read as
an attempt to establish a metrization of weight and that the center of gravity cannot
be used within this attempt, since this notion depends on the metrization of weight
[Beisenherz 1980, 457–459].
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terms of manipulations “performed in thought”, i. e., manipulations performed
by means of a graphical representation. Of course, this representation itself
tacitly rests on the notion of the center of gravity, for it seems that in reality,
the original weight of 10 at the beginning of the proof was not intended to
be a physical body, but rather represents the center of gravity which remains
unchanged in the following steps.
Before going into the details of the Mach-Hölder controversy, two remarks
should be made in order to facilitate the discussion. These remarks concern
features of the proof which will not be of importance to our discussion and thus
can be dealt with in a short comment. First, it should be noted that the proof
only applies to commensurable ratios of lengths and weights. Archimedes,
however, generalized it to apply to both, commensurable and incommensu-
rable ratios. The generalized proof essentially consists of a reduction of the
problem of incommensurable ratios to commensurable ratios by subtracting
an appropriate amount of one of the weights, thus completely resting on the
simpler case. Since the point of the whole discussion regards a step of the
basic proof for the case of commensurable quantities, I will not refer to the
extension to the case of incommensurable quantities in the following. Second,
there are three further suppositions tacitly made in the proof which should
be mentioned: (1) that the weights are made of a homogeneous material, (2)
that the lever is perfectly rigid and of mass zero, and (3) finally that the
lever is put into a homogeneous gravity field. All three suppositions may be
classified as idealizations not uncommon to mechanics. As regards the third
point, concerning the gravity field, Hölder himself parted with the supposition
of homogeneity by abstracting from the origin of the acting forces. In fact, he
mostly did not speak about weight, but simply about acting forces in general. 3
These suppositions are also not of interest to the purpose of the present paper
and will not be mentioned again.
2.3 Mach’s critique of the proof
Archimedes, as Hölder and Mach understood him, claimed to establish the
Law of the Lever by means of a special case, namely by showing that an
asymmetric configuration can be reached based on a symmetric one simply
by distributing and recombining weights symmetrically. In his Die Mechanik
3. Palmieri recently took up this issue in a paper from 2008, showing that the
actual form of the Law of the Lever is contingent on the specific form of the earth’s
gravity field. I believe Hölder and Mach were perfectly aware of this. In his re-
sponse to Palmieri, Van Dyck additionally provides evidence that the problem of
the uniqueness of the center of gravity of bodies on the curved surface of the earth
was already discussed in the sixteenth century by Simon Stevin and Guidobaldo del
Monte [Van Dyck 2009, 318]. Palmieri’s overall aim in his two papers, [Palmieri 2008],
[Palmieri 2009] is to defend Mach’s rejection of non-empirical sources of knowledge.
In light of the Mach-Hölder debate, however, it becomes clear that this point actually
was not at issue.
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in ihrer Entwicklung, historisch-kritisch dargestellt from 1883, Ernst Mach
claimed that such a proof cannot be sound. In fact, the theorem to be proven,
i. e., the Law of the Lever, must have been tacitly presupposed—otherwise it
would have been impossible to derive it from the given premises, dealing only
with the special case of symmetric distributions. Mach analyzed the proof and
accurately localized the point where tacit presupposition enters into the proof.
According to Mach’s analysis, the first half of the proof (leading from fig. 1-32
to 1-34) is sound. Indeed, the weights are displaced symmetrically with regard
to the fulcrum. In the second step (fig. 1-35, 36), on the other hand, the
weights are recombined symmetrically with regard to a point located beside
the fulcrum. Such an operation is feasible only if an additional condition








Figure 2: Mach’s analysis of the Archimedean proof.
the fulcrum) must exert the same force on the lever as both weights when
separately located at the points d−h and d+h (that is, the effects of displacing
them from position d to d − h and d + h, respectively must compensate for,
or cancel out, each other). In mathematical terms, the following functional
equation must hold:
2m · f(d) = m · f(d− h) +m · f(d+ h). (6)
It is then easy to show that this implies that f is a linear function of d, i. e.,
that f(d) = α · d, and hence that the presupposition is equivalent to the Law
of the Lever. 4 Thus, Mach concludes, the proof is circular.
4. I should mention that the first to use these mathematical terms was actually
Vailati in his article from 1904. However, from Mach’s texts it is clear that the
argument presented here was the one intended by him and that he was aware of
the fact that the compensation of the effects of a symmetric displacement beside the
fulcrum is equivalent to the Law of the Lever—otherwise his arguments would make no
sense. I stress this point because of a paper published by Palmieri in 2008 containing
circumstantial proof of the equivalence in question, where the author claims to be the
first one to make this mathematical argument. Actually, Hölder explicitly indicated
how to prove the equivalence in Die mathematische Methode [Hölder 1924, 44–45,
note 1].
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2.4 Hölder’s defense of Archimedes’ proof
In one of his extensive annotations to Anschauung und Denken in der
Geometrie, Hölder’s inaugural lecture at Leipzig hold on June 22, 1899, Hölder
responded to Mach’s critique. In that lecture, he explicitly denied that the
Archimedean proof presupposes the law to be proven:
Mach advances the view that in the Archimedean Proof it is al-
ready presupposed that the effect that a weight exerts on the lever
depends on the product of the magnitudes of the weight and the
arm of the lever. This is not the case. [Hölder 1900, 63, Eng.
trans. 44]
In order to defend the Archimedean proof, Hölder came up with a detailed
analysis of its premises, one which is, I believe, much more subtle than what
one finds in Mach and thus deserving a closer look. Hölder, in accordance
with Mach, identified the symmetric replacement beside the fulcrum as the
problematic point. According to Hölder, this substitution can be “accounted
for” based on two arguments: first of all, through experiences with symmet-
ric scales; second by the “assumption”, as Hölder puts it, “that the observed
equivalence [i. e., on the symmetric scale] also holds true under different cir-
cumstances”. “Under different circumstances” here clearly means: beside the
fulcrum. Hölder continues in his analysis and finds that the assumption that
symmetric displacements are also feasible beside the fulcrum can be reduced
to the following:
a system of forces acting on a rigid body is in equilibrium, if a
part of the forces considered separately is in equilibrium and if the
same also holds of the other part of the forces. This is a postulate
(an axiomatic assumption)—motivated, of course, by experience.
[Hölder 1900, 64, Eng. trans. 44]
Hölder thus reduces the second tacit assumption of the Archimedean proof
to the superposability of equilibria, as he explicitly makes clear elsewhere
[Hölder 1931, 322]. To summarize, Hölder seeks to rationally reconstruct the
Archimedean proof based on the following two assumptions which serve as its
premises:
(P1) Symmetrical configurations are in equilibrium and displacements
symmetric to the fulcrum do not disturb equilibria. That is, in fig. 3:




Figure 3: Premise 1 in Hölder’s reconstruction.
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(P2) Equilibria can be superposed. That is, in fig. 4: If configuration











Figure 4: Premise 2 in Hölder’s reconstruction.
It is clear that these two premises lead to a generalization of the case of the
symmetric lever. According to the premises, symmetric displacements of equal
weights are feasible at any point on the configuration, and not only when
symmetric with regard to the fulcrum. The second premise is equivalent to
the assumption that any subsystem can be reduced to its center of gravity. In
Hölder’s formulation, this premise is particularly striking, because, when read
backwards, it yields a kind of geometrical or even graphical algorithm for the
analysis of matter distributions. Applying these rules (in the order P2-P1-P2)
yields a justification for the critical step in the proof of the Law of the Lever

















Figure 5: Hölder’s analysis of the step (I) → (II) in fig. 2.
It seems that Hölder was elaborating here on what Archimedes actually
did in his proof, i. e., picking out subsystems and manipulating them symmet-
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rically with regard to their respective center of gravity. In this way, Hölder
accounted for the equivalence of (I) and (II) in Mach’s proof (fig. 2) through
the equivalence of (I∗∗) and (II∗∗) in (P2), i. e., the assumption that any sub-
system can be reduced to its center of gravity. However, as Mach made clear,
this premise is precisely equivalent to the Law of the Lever, as becomes obvi-
ous when spelled out in mathematical terms as done above in the functional
equation (6). The proposition P3 (comprising P1 and P2)
(P3) Displacements of equal weights are feasible (i. e., equilibrium con-
serving) when symmetric to any point on the configuration.
is strictly equivalent, as is established in the proof of the Law of the Lever, to
the proposition
(P4) Displacement of weights is feasible (i. e., equilibrium conserving)
when, with regard to the fulcrum, reciprocal to the weights.
The latter proposition is, of course, the Law of the Lever. Hölder’s analysis of
the premises is certainly more subtle than Mach’s, but in how far then does it
challenge Mach’s criticism? Here is the conclusion Hölder himself drew from
his analysis:
Whatever one might think about Archimedes’ suppositions [P3],
it cannot be denied that it is not possible to immediately, i.e., by
means of the mere power of judgment, perceive in them the Law of
the Lever [P4], though this metrical law necessarily follows from
these suppositions in a mathematical reasoning. [Hölder 1900, 65,
Eng. trans. 44]
Hölder hence willingly admits that the Law of the Lever follows from the
premises. This indeed amounts to nothing other than stating that the proof
is sound. Hölder’s point is clearly a different one. He does not deny that the
conclusion is contained in the premises—and how could he have done this?
On the contrary, Hölder emphasizes the way the conclusion is contained in
the premises: The law to be proven is contained in the premises in such a
way that it is impossible to conceive it through “the mere power of judgment”.
It is difficult to say what this power of judgment consists in exactly, but if
one accepts talk of “containment” of the conclusion in the (conjunction of
the) premises—as did Mach, Hölder, and Vailati—one arrives at a peculiar
diagnosis for the Mach-Hölder controversy: Clearly, both, Hölder and Mach,
admitted that the conclusion, i. e., the Law of the Lever, is implicitly contained
in the premises, but each drew contrary consequences from this. Mach states
that the conclusion is (implicitly) contained in the premises—hence the proof
is circular. Hölder, on the other hand, says that the conclusion is (implicitly)
contained in the premises—hence the proof is sound.
2.5 A failed dialogue
The paradoxical diagnosis characterized above is most certainly due to diverg-
ing conceptions of logic—Mach still thought of syllogistic logic, whereas Hölder
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already approached mathematical logic—and thus to the misguiding metaphor
of “containment”, a defect which we will later see how to avoid in the recon-
struction of Hölder’s argument (Section 3.2). But there is a different point
I would like to draw attention to: besides diverging conceptions of logic, at
least a partial explanation for the peculiar incommensurability of Hölder and
Mach’s arguments can be found in the fact that both had completely different
questions in mind when tackling the problem of deduction in mathematical
physics, illustrated by the Archimedean proof of the Law of the Lever. When
discussing this proof, both made clear what their intentions respectively con-
sisted of. For Mach, the leading question of his critical survey of mechanics
was whether there are non-empirical sources of knowledge. The answer he
gave was an emphatic “No!”, as he repeatedly highlights:
But the aim of my whole book is to convince the reader that
we cannot make up properties of nature with the help of self-
evident suppositions, but that these suppositions must be taken
from experience. [Mach 1915, 2, 7th German edition]
If we were unable philosophically and a priori to excogitate the
simple fact of the dependence of equilibrium on weight and dis-
tance, but were obliged to go for that result to experience, in how
much less a degree shall we be able, by speculative methods, to
discover the form of this dependence, the proportionality! [Mach
1919, 14, 4th German ed.]
Mach’s point clearly is that experience is the only source of knowledge and that
linking propositions by means of deduction cannot change that fact. Hölder,
however, completely agreed with Mach on the empirical nature of scientific
knowledge, a point which he repeatedly emphasized: he more or less took it
for granted that all scientific knowledge is empirical; 5 Hölder instead raised the
question of what, then, is the purpose of deduction and deductively organizing
empirical knowledge. In his comprehensive study Die mathematische Methode
from 1924, Hölder programmatically declared:
To clarify deductive reasoning by means of analyzing examples is
the main concern of my treatise. [Hölder 1924, 3]
And already in 1900 he had stressed that this aim can be achieved without
touching epistemological questions about the source of our knowledge, i. e.,
the kind of questions Mach was interested in [Hölder 1900, 8, Eng. trans.
19]. This discrepancy in Hölder’s and Mach’s aims might be at least a partial
explanation of why they could end up with such contrary conclusions, notwith-
standing a quite considerable agreement on the premises, namely that the Law
of the Lever is implicitly contained in Archimede’s assumptions, and that these
assumptions as well as the law deduced from them, are of empirical character.
5. In Anschauung und Denken Hölder takes both intuition and experience into
consideration as sources of knowledge, especially for geometric axioms [Hölder 1900,
57, Eng. trans. 41], and finally advocates for the latter [Hölder 1900, 72, Eng. trans.
47].
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Hölder tried to refocus the discussion toward the more important and more
promising issue of the function of deductively ordering empirical knowledge.
With regard to Mach, however, Hölder failed: Mach, though he appreciated
Hölder’s critique 6 and to some extent adopted Hölder’s terminology, 7 did not
readjust the focus of his critique, and his response to Hölder in the fourth
edition of Die Mechanik did not provide any substantial argument:
I cannot agree with O.Hölder who upholds the correctness of
the Archimedean deductions against my criticism in his essay
Anschauung und Denken in der Geometrie, although I am greatly
pleased with the extent of our agreement as to the nature of
the exact sciences and their foundations. It would seem as if
Archimedes (De aequiponderantibus) regarded it as a general ex-
perience that two equal weights may under all circumstances be
replaced by one equal to their combined weight at the center
(Theorem 5, Corollary 2). In such an event, his long deduction
(Theorem 6) would be [un]necessary [my correction of the transla-
tion, O. S.], for the reason sought follows immediately (see pp. 14,
513). Archimedes’ mode of expression is not in favor of this view.
Nevertheless, a theorem of this kind cannot be regarded as a pri-
ori evident; and the view advanced on pp. 14, 513 appears to me
to still be uncontroverted. [Mach 1919, 514–515]
Here Mach, when referring to Archimedes’ “mode of expression”, provided more
philological than systematical evidence and did not at all challenge Hölder’s
point. In particular, Mach did not attempt to analyze the origin of his dis-
sent from Hölder. The controversy thus ended before having revealed its real
subject matter.
2.6 The real issue: Mach and Hölder on logic and
proof in mathematical physics
What, then, should have been the substance of the Mach-Hölder-controversy?
It is clear from the preceding analysis that the underlying argument between
6. In the preface to the fourth edition, Mach underlined the following: “New books
and criticisms touching on my discussions have received attention in special addi-
tions, which in some instances have assumed considerable proportions. On these
strictures, O.Hölder’s note on my criticism of the Archimedean deduction (Denken
und Anschauung in der Geometrie, p. 63, note 62) has been of special value, inasmuch
as it afforded me the opportunity of establishing my view on still firmer foundations
(see pages 512–517). I do not at all dispute that rigorous demonstrations are as
possible in mechanics as in mathematics. But with respect to the Archimedean and
certain other deductions, I am still of the opinion that my point is the correct one”
[Mach 1901, xi]; [Mach 1919, xv–xvi].
7. This can be seen in the use of the phrases “the actions of two equal weights to
be the same under all circumstances as that of the combined weights ” [Mach 1919,
513] (my italics) and “general experience” [Mach 1919, 514].
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Mach and Hölder is not about non-empirical sources of knowledge, but about
the interest in structuring empirical knowledge in a deductive manner. Mach
and Hölder had different ideas about the role of logic and deduction, indeed.
Mach was quite clear about what he conceives as the role of logic. He de-
veloped his account of deduction in a short article, “Deduktion und Induktion
in psychologischer Beleuchtung”, published as a chapter of Erkenntnis und
Irrtum in 1905. It is there that he essentially repeated Mill’s critique of syllo-
gistic reasoning, i. e., that the general premise cannot be held without already
asserting the conclusion. He stressed that syllogisms hence do not provide new
knowledge, though one might have that impression: only experience is able to
provide knowledge. He comes to the following conclusion:
This alone shows that the opening up of new sources of knowledge
cannot be the task of the rules of logic, which rather serve only
to examine whether findings drawn from other sources agree or
disagree, and, if the latter, to point to the need to secure full
agreement. [Mach 1976, 225]
Here Mach offers an instrumentalist account of logic, the latter serving as a
mere corrective: In particular, there are no proofs in physics for Mach. Logic
does not uncover truth; it only indicates disagreement and thus error when
applied to knowledge drawn from experience.
Hölder, as we have seen, agrees with the point that experience is the only
source of knowledge. He nevertheless remains at odds with Mach as regards the
role of proof and deduction. His arguments are not self-evidently drawn from
the discussion with Mach since they failed to push the analysis of their dissent
that far. It at least seems to be clear, though, that Hölder, when claiming that
it is not possible, through the mere power of judgment, to immediately per-
ceive the Law of the Lever in the premises of the Archimedean proof [Hölder
1900, 65, Eng. trans. 44], directly answers Mach’s argument that a syllogism’s
conclusion “could have directly been seen” in the premises [Mach 1976, 227].
There is indeed a major difference between the proof of the Law of the Lever
and the ordinary syllogisms Mach refers to. Certainly it is impossible to main-
tain that all men are mortal without already asserting that (the man) Socrates
is mortal. It is also true that the conclusion of this syllogism can directly be
seen in the general premise, the latter being understood simply as a conjunc-
tion of all special cases. But does the same hold true for the proof of the
Law of the Lever? Hölder, being one generation younger than Mach, indeed
referred to Jevons’ “Logic of relatives” which he thought more adequate than
Aristotelian syllogisms to capture mathematical inferences in general [Hölder
1900, 41, n. 25, Eng. trans. 34]. As regards the Law of the Lever, too, Hölder
clearly believes that its proof cannot be modeled on a syllogism. Deriving the
Law of the Lever from its premises as Hölder reconstructed them (P1 and P2)
takes work. Vailati, who also used the metaphor of containment, made this
clear in the following impressive illustration:
Finally, the assertion that in Archimedes’ premises there is al-
ready implicitly contained the conclusion that he deduces from
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them, seems to me true only in the sense in which it is true of
any mathematical proof, insofar as in any mathematical proof the
truth of the proposition being proved appears as a simple conse-
quence of certain operations of selection, linking, and coordination
performed on fundamental propositions that are the basis of the
treatment. And this, to use a celebrated Aristotelian paragon, is
as far from diminishing the value of their discovery and of their
proof as it would be far from diminishing the value of a sculptor
to claim that the statue he created was already within the marble
from which he crafted it, and that he has done nothing but to
remove the superfluous parts from the block of marble.
[Vailati 1904], quotation from the English translation in [Palmieri
2009, 321]
We see, then, that Vailati agrees with what I have worked out to be Hölder’s
main point, 8 as did Dijksterhuis, it should be mentioned. 9 But in order to
emphasize the strength of Hölder’s perspective, I should restate the issue in
more abstract terms.
We saw that Mach thought logic to merely provide a check for consistency.
For example, if two empirical thoughts are in logical contradiction, at least one
of them must be false. However, “agreement” and “disagreement” of empirical
knowledge are symmetric relations, whereas deduction establishes a hierarchy
which is essentially asymmetric. Hölder took this hierarchy seriously and could
therefore use it in defending the Archimedean proof. This hierarchy indicates
a qualitative difference between the premises and the conclusions—a difference
which is bridged in deduction. This is precisely what Hölder was after. Put
into Vailatian terms, Hölder’s main concern was to explicate what it means
to get the statue out of the marble block, that is, to explicate (1.) in what
the difference between the premises and the conclusion consists and (2.) how
this difference is bridged in deduction. I will study Hölder’s answers to these
questions in the next section.
3 Hölder’s account of deduction in physics
The hierarchy between the premises and the conclusion must result from a
difference between them. In general, it is not easy to say what this differ-
ence actually consists of, though a first guess would be generality. But given
8. In fact Vailati already expressed this point in abstracto in his 1898 paper on
deduction [Vailati 1898, 690].
9. Dijksterhuis also shows that the Law of the Lever is the solution to equation
(6) and remarks: “Indeed, if it is not necessary to solve the functional equation in
this case, when is there any sense in doing so? And if in general the drawing of a
conclusion Q from a group of premises P may be called superfluous when P applies
only if Q is true, one may just as well reject as superfluous all mathematical proof,
for if Q is not true, it is clear that P will not hold!” [Dijksterhuis 1987, 294].
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Poincaré’s discussion on the principle of recurrence [Poincaré 1902], the an-
swer that the premises are simply more general must be ruled out as naive.
This was held true by Poincaré at least for arithmetical proofs involving in-
duction. But in the case of the proof of the Law of the Lever, it may also
hold that the premises (P3 in my reconstruction given above, p. 101) are not
necessarily more general than the conclusion (P4). 10 Hölder’s answer is that
the difference lies in degrees of epistemic simplicity. This will be explained in
Section 3.1. In deduction, this difference is then bridged by synthesis, which
Hölder parallels to, or even identifies with, deduction, as will be explained in
Section 3.2. It will then be shown in Section 3.3, that this account holds true,
according to Hölder, not for the whole of physics, but only for those parts
which can be reconstructed on the basis of axioms expressing simple experi-
ences. Aside from these parts, there are different domains which do not rest
on axioms, but on hypotheses.
3.1 Axioms in mechanics
As I have already emphasized, Hölder, like Mach, believed both premises and
conclusions, to be empirical. Hölder’s analysis of deduction thus had nothing
to do with the quest for non-empirical sources of knowledge, the main target
of Mach’s empiricist criticism. However, as already seen in Anschauung und
Denken in der Geometrie from 1900, Hölder suggested that the premises and
the conclusion might be the result of different kinds of experience, which will
then turn out to be his main point about the difference between axioms and
theorems:
already the experience of every-day life might lead us to postulate
the Archimedean assumptions [P1 and P2], which recommands
these assumptions as the simpler foundations. [Hölder 1900, 65,
Eng. trans. 44]
The difference between the premises and the conclusion is hence reduced to the
difference between two different kinds of experience that they originate from;
the former are the result of everyday experiences, whereas the latter require
a somehow more demanding kind of experience. Hölder took up this issue in
several of his writings [Hölder 1914, 1924, 1931] from which it is possible to
achieve a quite precise picture of what he had in mind when distinguishing
between different kinds of experience.
In Die Arithmetik in strenger Begründung of 1914 Hölder gives an impor-
tant hint when using the tacit premises of the Law of the Lever worked out
in Anschauung und Denken in order to provide a metrization of weight—an
issue also present in Anschauung und Denken when discussing the problem of
the rigid body, a prominent question in the contemporary discussion on the
10. P3 holds true for any given point, but is restricted to equal weights; P4, in
turn, holds for any given pair of weights but is restricted to the fulcrum as the point
of reference.
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foundations of geometry and measurement. 11 It appears that Hölder did not
work out the details of this idea; 12 but from his remarks it already becomes
clear, that the difference between quality and quantity is somehow supposed
to be in line with the difference between the premises in question and the con-
clusion, the Law of the Lever, for metrization consists in establishing quantity
on a fundament which is not quantitative. In Die mathematische Methode
from 1924 Hölder finally explicitly applies the terms of quality and quantity
in order to make clear his point and to definitively refute Mach’s critique:
It should also be mentioned that the assumptions were not of
quantitative, but of purely qualitative nature [. . . ]. Hence the
criticisms Mach directed against the famous Archimedean proof of
the Law of the Lever should be considered as invalidated. [Hölder
1924, 318]
It is thus clear that Hölder considered deduction of the Law of the Lever to
be the same as establishing a metrical law on a purely qualitative fundament.
This fundament consists in the qualitative axioms first that symmetrical con-
figurations are in equilibrium and second, that equilibria can be superposed,
while the conclusion states in quantitative terms that, in equilibrium, length is
inversely proportional to weight. In order to discuss this more closely I quote
the premises as Hölder explained them in 1931, when touching on the problem
for the last time [Hölder 1931, 322]:
1. Two forces of equal direction and equal magnitude, when acting on a
rigid body, can be equilibrated by a force of opposite direction and
twofold magnitude acting on the body at the midpoint between these
two forces.
2. Equilibria, when superposed, result in equilibria.
3. Two forces acting on a body at the same point are equivalent to their
sum when they are coming from the same direction, and cancel when
they are coming from opposite directions.
It is obvious that these axioms do not dispose of quantity tout court. They
presuppose quantitative notions of force (or, in the more special case of
Archimedean statics, of weight) and of distance. Taken at face value Hölder’s
claim is hence wrong. But apart from the implausibility of such an obvious
mistake there are other reasons for considering Hölder’s claim more carefully.
For there is indeed a difference between the premises and the conclusion which
is linked to establishing a metrical law: The premises take length and weight
(force) into consideration separately while the conclusion contains a state-
ment about their functional dependence. Thus the issue is not establishing
single quantities, as indicated in the 1914 paper [Hölder 1914], but estab-
lishing functional dependencies between different quantities. The confusion
11. [Hölder 1900, 5, 30, Eng. trans. 17, 30]; [Hölder 1924, 370–371], where he refers
to [Zindler 1889]; [Dingler 1925, 310–330], and, according to [Heath 1926, vol. III,
226–227], [Veronese 1891]; etc.
12. Unlike [Beisenherz 1980], who is quite in agreement with Hölder’s approach.
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between establishing quantity and establishing quantitative relations becomes
less problematic when one takes into account that Hölder, as we will see, re-
garded them as successive steps in the establishment of mechanics. These steps
fit into Hölder’s larger idea of the make-up of mathematical sciences which he
circumscribed by the notion of synthesis, as will be explained next.
3.2 Deduction and synthesis
In his comprehensive study Die mathematische Methode from 1924 Hölder de-
veloped an overall view of mathematical sciences with which his considerations
on the Law of the Lever fit well. The Law of the Lever undeniably plays the
role of a case study for Hölder’s approach. The correlation with geometry, for
example, is striking in the following quotation:
Geometry also develops metrical dependencies based on certain
simple facts concerning equality and some other relations. [Hölder
1924, 45]
In this book Hölder develops a general theory of concept formation by means
of “synthesis”. He adopted this term from his former teacher Paul du Bois-
Reymond who used it synonymously with “Construction” (construction) and
“Aufbau” (built-up) [Hölder 1900, 71–72, Eng. trans. 47], [du Bois-Reymond
1890, 14]. In [Hölder 1924, 5–6], synthesis consists of the construction of new
concepts with the goal to identify and to substantiate hidden properties of
already known concepts. Synthesis is clearly paralleled to, or even identified
with, deduction which, as we have seen, also brings out implicit knowledge:
The construction [Aufbau] of concepts here even constitutes a part
of the proof. [Hölder 1924, 5]
In geometry and mechanics, as Hölder explains, the concepts synthesized are
constructed on the basis of intuitive or empirical concepts (as “point”, “straight
line”, “plane”, “angle”, “force”, “mass”). These concepts serve as a basis for
a conceptual “super-structure” achieved by way of synthesis. Hölder stresses
that this super-structure can again serve as a basis for iterated acts of synthesis
([Hölder 1924, 318]; cf. also the hints given in [Waerden 1938, 100]).
Hölder then expands this view to all mathematical disciplines, including
arithmetic, geometry, and mechanics, by distinguishing between pure syn-
thetic and hypothetico-synthetic concepts, [Hölder 1924, 295]. The former
are products of an intellectual activity such as setting and canceling, unifying
and separating, sequencing and coordinating [Hölder 1924, 296]. In partic-
ular, they yield numbers and operations on numbers [Hölder 1924, 161ff.].
With hypothetico-synthetic concepts, on the other hand, something empirical
adheres to them insofar as the elements they are constructed from have an em-
pirical meaning and insofar as the axioms involved are “occasioned”, as Hölder
states, by experience [Hölder 1924, 295]. The counterparts to intellectual ac-
tivities are geometrical and physical operations such as the concatenation of
quantities [Hölder 1924, 297]. Hypothetico-synthetic concepts in particular
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are the concept of measure in general [Hölder 1924, 51], the measure of the
arm of the lever [Hölder 1924, 318], and the concept of the center of gravity
[Hölder 1924, 294]. The simple elements which are used in the construction
or synthesis of the concept of measure in particular are the relation of order,
equality, and addition [Hölder 1924, 67]. As regards the elements of mechanics,
Hölder makes clear that both logical deduction and a formalist treatment fail
(on Hölder’s critique of formalism in general cf. [Radu 2003]), thus it holds
true that they have to be exemplified in the empirical context of their original
abstraction [Hölder 1924, 403]. He stressed that this context is situated in
daily life and paid special attention to manual production procedures like the
so-called three-plate procedure in the production of steel planes. 13
The distinction between intellectual and physical operations as the ba-
sis of arithmetic on the one hand and geometry as well as mechanics on the
other hand makes sense. Indeed, in counting, one brings together the objects
counted simply by successively considering them. For example when count-
ing the planets of the solar system, the actual planets may stay where they
are; it is sufficient to consider them as planets in order to count them and to
determine their number. Counting thus involves purely intellectual activity
and no causal manipulation of the objects counted. In measurement, on the
other hand, where arithmetic is somehow put into practice, things are much
more complicated, for measurement is something more than counting: It is
counting so as to determine the magnitude of a property. Here the objects
really (physically) have to be brought together in a specific way so as to con-
catenate, say, two unit quantities to a quantity of double magnitude. In order
to do that, one basically needs an empirical operation of comparison and an
empirical operation of addition.
To conclude, we recognize two synthetical steps in the formulation of the
Law of the Lever, leading from qualitative to quantitative notions and from
quantitative notions to metrical laws correlating two quantities:
basic layer qualitative concepts order, equality, addition
(Lebenswelt)
first layer quantitative concepts weight, distance
second layer metrical laws and center of gravity, measure of
concepts comprising the lever f(m, d) = m · d
several quantities
Weight and distance are two quantitative concepts synthesized from the re-
13. [Hölder 1924, 370]. This idea is known from [Helmholtz 1887], [Helmholtz 1977]
and, in particular, from Hugo Dingler. Hölder however does not refer to Dingler, but
to [Hjelmslev 1916]. This procedure allows for producing planes without the need for
a prototype. For an English description, cf. Wolter’s note to the English translation
[Dingler 1988, 385].
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spective physical operations of comparison and addition. Adding the simple,
pre-metrical fact that equilibria can be superposed, yields, again by way of
synthesis, the Law of the Lever, codifying knowledge that before was some-
how hidden in the simple elements. In Archimedes, this knowledge enters into
the concept of the center of gravity, and it is interesting to see that scien-
tific concepts are not mere composites of arbitrary conceptual elements, but
actually codify empirical knowledge. Hölder did not work with the concept
of the center of gravity. In Hölder, the knowledge codified in this concept
rather provided a kind of (representational or graphical) rule in the analysis
of equilibria which is then used in the proof of the Law of the Lever. This
rule, however, brings about the same result, since it allows for the reduction
of arbitrary subsystems to their respective center of gravity. In establishing
the Law of the Lever, two quantities—mass and length—are thus tied together
by forming a new concept—center of gravity—which is constituted from both
and which comprises their relation, i. e., the Law of the Lever.
It is not inappropriate to refer to this kind of concept formation as “syn-
thesis”. Moreover, I believe that Hölder’s account, by which deduction is
identified with synthesis, indeed challenges Mach’s critique of the proof of the
Law of the Lever. We saw that both, Mach and Hölder, used the perhaps
misleading metaphor of “containment” of the conclusion within the premises.
Here is a definition of circularity from more recent literature which avoids this
metaphor:
What is standardly taken to make an argument circular is, that
every reason for doubting the conclusion is an equally strong rea-
son for doubting one or more of the premises or inferences which
lead up to the conclusion. [Detlefsen 1986, 60]
Applying this to Hölder’s account indeed shows that reasons for doubting
a proposition involving synthesized concepts of level n (testing the Law of
the Lever in measurement) are not equally strong reasons for doubting the
premises which are built from synthesized concepts of level n − 1 and which
thus rest on a simpler, less sophisticated kind of experience (the qualitative
experience expressed in the premises P1 and P2). This seems to me to be the
argument behind Hölder’s short commentary from Die mathematische Methode
already quoted above (cf. p. 107), namely that the assumptions of the proof are
of purely qualitative nature and that hence Mach’s critique is invalid [Hölder
1924, 318]. Therefore, even if Mach is right in that the proof of the Law of
the Lever does not change our epistemological situation (in the sense that it
does not dispose of experience, but merely shows different experiences to be
compatible), Hölder succeeds in showing that our discursive situation defini-
tively changes (for the proof provides stronger arguments by linking given
experiences to experiences of a simpler kind). 14
14. It seems that Van Dyck, in his defense of Vailati against a misreading by
Palmieri [Palmieri 2008], has a quite similar point in mind when explaining that,
according to Vailati, the Law of the Lever is “a more informative way to describe
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3.3 Deduction and explanation
The above account of deduction in terms of synthesis, however, was not meant
to hold true for the whole of physics. Indeed, there is evidence in Die mathema-
tische Methode that Hölder admitted a special status to the Law of the Lever
and mechanics in general within mathematical physics. This becomes evident
when distinguishing more carefully between axioms and hypotheses or assump-
tions. In fact, it was common during Hölder’s time to distinguish between
hypotheses and axioms as regards their epistemological function and status.
Nadine de Courtenay substantiated this distinction in a recent study in partic-
ular in Meinong, whose work was well known to, and casually cited by, Hölder
[de Courtenay 2010]. De Courtenay reconstructs the distinction between hy-
potheses and axioms in terms of representational modes: 15 “Assumptions and
hypotheses both appear as indirect modes of presentation in contrast to the di-
rect mode akin to axioms.” The direct mode of representation arises, according
to de Courtenay, from abstraction from the phenomena investigated while the
indirect mode of representation depends on the means of description and may
even lead to propositions contrary to the facts, in which case the correspond-
ing representations cannot refer to any existing thing [de Courtenay 2010, 45].
De Courtenay stresses that the different modes of representation carry with
them different conceptions of explanation: In contrast to axioms, hypotheses
lead to more than a mere classification of facts, but “[imply] a causal relation:
A stipulated external object or system, exemplifying the properties denoted
by the alien system of concepts, is responsible for the causal production of
the empirical phenomena observed” [de Courtenay 2010, 44–45]. The point
regarding the modes of presentation fits quite well with Hölder’s account, as
will become clear. We have already seen that Hölder did not think of axioms
as self-evident judgments which are neither empirically verifiable nor, in the
case of mathematics, demonstrable. From his analysis of the Archimedean
proof, it is clear that Hölder thought of axioms as expressions of simple em-
pirical facts (whereby “simple” is to be understood relatively to the next layer
of synthesized concepts). This does not only apply to Archimedean statics,
but also hold true for an astonishingly large part of mechanics. Hölder explic-
itly mentions Newton’s third law (equality of action and reaction) as well as
d’Alembert’s principle, 16 which are considered to be abstracted from simple
what is allowed by [the premises of its proof]” and that “we can see Archimedes as
using mathematics to reorganize the empirical information already at his disposal”
[Van Dyck 2009, 316–317].
15. According to de Courtenay, there is a further distinction between hypotheses
and assumptions which lacks a counterpart in Hölder. Hypotheses and assumptions,
though they are on a par as regards the mode of representation, differ as to the mental
attitude: “Assumptions and hypotheses encapsulate different attitudes of the subject
towards his object: Assumptions do not involve belief, whereas hypotheses do involve
belief” [de Courtenay 2010, 43].
16. Cf. also Jourdain’s analysis [Jourdain 1912, 298–301] of Hölder’s work on
d’Alembert’s principle and analytical mechanics [Hölder 1896].
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experiences and then generalized by way of analogy [Hölder 1924, 430–431].
Hölder, however, recognizes a limitation in this method. In particular ther-
modynamics, electrodynamics, the theory of atoms, and relativity theory are
said to rest on hypotheses which essentially differ from axioms [Hölder 1924,
§ 151, § 155–165]. According to Hölder, hypotheses
are assumptions which postulate a basically non-empirical rela-
tion, a relation often even in contradiction with experience to a
certain degree. [Hölder 1924, 434]
Hypotheses postulate the existence of objects whose properties
are commonly not found together in experience. So the atom,
which has physical mass without being divisible, and the ether,
which bears physical properties without mass. [Hölder 1924, 381,
note 2]
Hölder’s distinction between axioms expressing simple empirical facts and hy-
potheses postulating facts essentially beyond experience and intuition some-
how fits with the distinction Vailati made between two ends of deduction,
namely deduction as a means of proof and deduction as a means of research
[Vailati 1898]. In the first case, deduction consists in reducing the disputable
to the indisputable, that is, the axioms; in the second case, the indisputable
phenomenon takes the place of the conclusion, which is linked by means of de-
duction to the hypotheses; hypotheses are essentially disputable, but serve to
explain the phenomenon. Vailati thus probably conceives proof and explana-
tion as an exclusive alternative, as did Hölder. Thus it is clear that the lessons
drawn from the Law of the Lever were not intended to be generalized onto
physics in general. Mechanics seems to hold a special status where deduction
does not yield an explanation derived from non-empirical microscopic entities
(postulated by hypotheses), but rather a synthetic construction of the theory
derived from basic experiences (expressed in the axioms).
4 Conclusion
Hölder’s account of deduction in mathematical physics is of interest for two
reasons:
First he provided a more subtle analysis of the proof of the Law of the Lever
than Mach. Mach had, indeed, called attention to a weak point of the proof;
however, primarily due to the anti-apriorist motivation of his critique and his
Aristotelian conception of logic, he ended up with the result that deduction
in physics plays a rather marginal role since it does not create non-empirical
knowledge, thus does not help disposing of experience. This result is plainly
inadequate, for it does not explain why empirical knowledge is arranged in
deductively structured theories at all.
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The second point of interest is the theory of concept formation implied
in Hölder’s account of deduction. His theory of synthesis is admittedly dif-
ficult to understand, and perhaps not even consistently worked out in his
magnum opus Die mathematische Methode from 1924; nonetheless, it offers a
quite fascinating account. According to Hölder, concepts are synthesized ei-
ther from empirical elements (including equality, order, etc.) or from formerly
synthesized concepts. As such they have, as Hölder says, “hidden properties”,
brought out in further synthetical steps. I believe that this feature should be
assessed in comparison with theories which explain concept formation in terms
of nominal definitions. Hölder’s analysis of deduction in mechanics provides
a substantial argument for the view that concept formation is a much more
complicated process than the amalgamation of an enumerable set of properties
as one single notion for the sake of brevity. Hölder aimed at a reconstruction of
scientific concepts on the basis of everyday linguistic and manual competences
(as Hölder stresses in [Hölder 1900, 65, Eng. trans. 44] and [Hölder 1924,
403]), while paying special attention to manual production procedures like
the so-called three-plate procedure in the production of steel planes [Hölder
1924, 370]. This account bears a certain resemblance to Hugo Dingler’s ap-
proach (cf. [Dingler 1988]), notwithstanding the apparent incompatibility on
a rhetoric level, namely empiricist in the case of Hölder and rationalist in the
case of Dingler. Both argue for non-holistic semantics and hold quantitative
concepts to be definable in (or synthesizable from) purely qualitative concepts.
In particular, this involves the problem of defining the rigid body in qualitative
terms, which Hölder explicitly considered possible without resorting to a solu-
tion in terms of conventions [Hölder 1924, 370–371]. Nevertheless there is also
a strong affinity to Poincaré’s conventionalist approach. For, unlike Dingler,
Hölder stressed the role of experience in concept formation and agreed with
Poincaré on the rejection of naive empiricism: concept formations, according
to Poincaré and Hölder, do not match or copy experience, but are “occasioned
by experience”. It thus becomes clear that Hölder pursued an original path
between rationalism and empiricism fully deserving of attention.
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